Major Themes in Economics
Volume 8

Article 6

Spring 2006

Should Corporate Farming be Limited in the United States?: An
Economic Perspective
Nathan Wittmaack
University of Northern Iowa

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie
Part of the Economics Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you
Copyright ©2006 by Major Themes in Economics
Recommended Citation
Wittmaack, Nathan (2006) "Should Corporate Farming be Limited in the United States?: An Economic
Perspective," Major Themes in Economics, 8, 45-59.
Available at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol8/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CBA Journals at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Major Themes in Economics by an authorized editor of UNI ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@uni.edu.

Should Corporate Farming be Limited in the
United States?: An Economic Perspective
Nathan Wittmaack
ABSTRACT. Farming in the United States has changed drastically over the last century.
Technology has improved farmers’ ability to produce. Economies of scale available from
new technology have led to restructuring in the agricultural industry. Fewer and larger
farms are now the norm. As technology improved, corporations began to increase activity
in agricultural sectors. Sectors such as livestock are more susceptible to corporate farming.
Many Americans are opposed to corporate farming because of the perceived negative
effects on rural America. Limiting corporate farming, though, is not a good way to protect
rural America. Corporate farming leads to a more efficient industry and more social
benefits. This paper identifies the alleged negative effects of corporate farming, why it is
occurring, and why it should not be opposed.

I. Introduction
In 1920 there were approximately 6.5 million farms in the United States.
30.1 percent of the population lived on farms. In 1992 those numbers
were down to 2 million farms and less than 2 percent of the population
living on farms [Allen and Lueck, 1998, 344].
The farming industry of today bears little resemblance to that of
yesterday. Corporate farming has challenged the age-old structure of
farming. Proponents of corporate farming say that it is more efficient
than family farming and leads to more affordable food supplies.
Opponents say the difference in efficiency does not justify the damage
done to the rural way of life. Should agricultural states oppose corporate
farming? Using economic theory, reasoning, and research, the paper
concludes that corporate farming is economically more efficient than
family farming in some circumstances. The assumption that corporate
farming is a significant factor in the decrease of family farms is
challenged as well.

II. Background
Since the Industrial Revolution, corporations have proven to be the most
advantageous form of the industrial firm. The large sums of capital that
corporations can raise allow them to take advantage of economies of
45
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scale. Corporations also enjoy limited liability. Henry Ford perfected a
key ingredient to industrial efficiency. The assembly line made it easier
to realize economies of scale. Economies of scale are the decreased costs
per additional unit of input due to synergies in production. As production
volume increases, the initial cost can be divided among more units of
output. The assembly line is based on gains from specialization. As
industry became more mechanized, it required fewer people to produce
the same amount. It was, and still is, rare for an individual to own the
resources required to capture substantial economies of scale. The
corporate form of ownership is most able to capture economies of scale
from industrialization.
Historically, agriculture has retained the “family firm” structure
to a greater degree than other industries. Allen and Lueck suggest that
this is largely due to the seasonality and randomness of nature and “the
interplay of these qualities generates moral hazard, limits the gains from
specialization, and causes timing problems between stages of production
[1998, 343].” Agricultural sub-sectors experience different specialization
and timing problems. For example, soybean farming must be done in a
strict order and time frame that corresponds to natural seasons. Hog
farming, though, takes place almost entirely indoors and is not as affected
by natural cycles or variables. Government subsidies have allowed some
types of family farmers to remain in the industry.
Corporate influence in farming has grown over the past 30 years.
Not surprisingly, it has grown the most in sectors not as affected by
natural cycles. The number of family farms in grain crop production has
dropped over this period. The drop in family farms has not been due to
corporate farming so much as the increasing size of the family farm.
Many rural citizens blame the decrease in family farms on the increase in
corporate farms. There are many arguments that have been made against
corporate farming; they are discussed in section III. Opponents of
corporate farming have responded by calling for legislation to prevent it.
Several Midwestern states have taken legislative steps to slow the
spread of corporate farming. The first significant step in anti-corporate
legislation occurred in the mid-1970s. In 1974, South Dakota enacted the
Family Farm Act [Pietila, 2001, 153]. Iowa followed suit in 1975 with
Iowa Code Chapter 9H.2 that prevents meatpackers from raising livestock
[Vogel, 2004, 201]. Since that time, there have been various attempts by
Midwestern states to legislate against corporate farming. The main thrust
of the legislation has been to make it illegal for corporations to own
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multiple stages of production. The constitutionality of some of this
legislation has been called into question recently. The 8th circuit United
States District Court of Appeals recently repealed certain family farming
acts in South Dakota [McDonough, 2003, 18]. Iowa’s protectionist law
was struck down as well by the United States District Court in the
Southern District of Iowa [Vogel, 2004, 200]. These rulings were made
on the basis of the dormant Commerce Clause found in Article One
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. The dormant Commerce Clause limits
the power of states to discriminate against out of state economic interests
[Vogel, 2004, 209].

III. Arguments Against Corporate Farming
There are several hypothetical negative effects of corporate farming.
There are many fewer family farms now than seventy years ago. Rural
Americans, and others, are concerned that the decreasing number of
family farms is harming the rural economy. Many rural Americans worry
that corporate farming erodes their economy and their culture. Some
people believe that vertical integration in food markets leads to a
dangerous concentration of power over our food stock [Lyson and Welsh,
2005, 1489]. Remaining family farmers worry about access to markets.
Others believe the savings of economies of scale in certain agricultural
markets are not benefiting the consumer. Finally, some fear that
corporate farming poses an unnecessary threat to the environment.
A. DECREASE IN NUMBER OF FAMILY FARMS
As explained in section II, the number of family farms and the population
living on farms has declined drastically over the last 80 years. In 1933
there were approximately 6.5 million farms in the U.S.; in 2000 there
were approximately 2 million [Tweeten, 2002, 1]. Opponents of
corporate farming claim that the commercial corporate farming approach
is a cause of the decline in family farms. Residents see corporate farming
interests expand and believe it is driving out family farmers.
B. RURAL ECONOMY FEARS
The fear of a declining rural economy due to corporate farming is related
to the decrease in the number of family farms. A study performed by
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Lyson and Welsh revealed rural economic problems associated with
corporate farming. In the research, Lyson and Welsh conclude that
corporate farming is associated with higher rates of unemployment and
poverty [2005, 1487-1488].
As corporate farms continue to get larger, they will secure their
inputs from centralized and standardized distributors [Lyson and Welsh,
2005, 1480]. Historically, the family farm did its agricultural business
locally. This trade supported a huge number of agricultural businesses in
rural communities. These businesses include grain elevators, community
banks, farm supply stores, implement dealerships, seed dealers, and so on.
Corporate farms do not rely on local resources like these; they secure
their inputs and working capital from centrally located, large suppliers.
If a corporate farm has fifty percent of the business in a rural area, the
agriculture-related industry in that area has half as much business to
support.
C. RURAL CULTURE FEARS
If the rural economy begins to collapse, it would have substantial impact
on the culture in rural America. Small towns dominate the countryside
of rural America, and many farmsteads dot the expanse between towns
(though many fewer than 70 years ago). Small towns in rural America
exist to support the agriculture that takes place around them. Nearly
everything in a small town revolves around agriculture, even if it seems
unrelated. These communities are a very distinct part of America’s
culture. Time seems to have moved much slower in small town rural
America. Here, values of honesty, perseverance, hard work, dedication,
and Godliness are embraced as the ideal. Morning coffee is a ritual, as is
Sunday morning church. This subculture of America is very unique, but
some believe that it will be lost if corporate farming is able to progress
unchecked.
D. CONCENTRATION OF POWER
When one organization, or small group of organizations, amasses
increasingly larger proportions of a scarce resource, its control over the
market for that resource becomes much more substantial. For example,
there are only 47 Tucker cars currently in existence [“Tucker History,” 3].
If each of the Tuckers were in different individual’s possessions, any one
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of them would sell for market value, and no individual owner would be
able to influence the market price. If someone owned 45 of the existing
47 Tuckers, he would be able to control the market for Tucker cars. They
could demand a premium because of the power they have in the market
for Tuckers. This is the very concept that farm families are worried
about. In the swine industry, the largest four companies control 60
percent of the market. 80 percent of the beef industry is controlled by the
biggest four [McDonough, 2003, 18]. Vogel maintains that there is an
alarmingly large discrepancy in power between meatpackers and
independent producers. As this disparity in power grows, and the
meatpackers continue to integrate with suppliers and buyers, the
efficiency that they gain is unlikely to be passed on to consumers [2004,
207].
E. ACCESS TO MARKETS
The United States Supreme Court has said that the framers of the
Constitution believed that every farmer should have access to every
market in the country [Vogel, 2004, 200]. Corporate farms command a
lot of market power. If a large corporate farm is integrated with a packer,
all of the product will be channeled through that packer. The packer may
not even accept product from farms that are not owned by or contracted
with the corporation. In the past, a farmer was free to sell to the packer
of his choice. The packer’s ability to control its inputs by coordinating
with its controlled farms eliminates its need to purchase that input from
non-contract farmers.
The existence of the corporate meatpacker may put other area
packers at risk. Corporation owned farms may have taken the place of
family farms that previously split sales between more than one
meatpacker. If the corporate farms all send their output to the corporate
packer, it may put other packers out of business. Sales from farms that
formerly had been divided would now all go to the corporate meatpacker.
If these non-integrated packers cannot stay in business, it further
decreases family farmer’s access to markets.
F. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
The main environmental concerns about corporate farming come from
large confinement operations. Brehm says that these operations are
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serious environmental threats to both water and air quality [2005, 811].
The shift from traditional livestock operations to large confinement
operations is a result of the vertical integration of the livestock production
system. As packers began contracting farmers to deliver set numbers of
livestock in set time frames, banks began to loan against the contracts.
Farmers then had access to enough capital to construct large, confinement
operations [Brehm, 2005, 798].
The waste produced by large numbers of confined animals is the
chief environmental concern. Applying the manure to farmland as
fertilizer creates the possibility of runoff into neighboring water sources.
Corporate farms often build lagoons, or large storage bunkers for waste.
Lagoons present the problems of seepage and overflow [Brehm, 2005,
812]. Due to the sheer volume of waste, an inherent environmental
danger exists. A water supply tainted by waste is undrinkable. Rivers,
streams, ponds, and lakes contaminated with manure will not support the
wildlife naturally found in them. Also, bacteria from the waste can make
water unfit to swim in, reducing economic benefits associated with
recreation.
Air pollution is another problem. Odors are created by livestock
operations. The odor alone is enough to cause neighbors of a proposed
confinement operation to protest. There is evidence that confinement
operations pollute the air with harmful chemicals. Ammonia and
hydrogen sulfide are present along with “volatile organic compounds”
[Brehm 2005, 812].
G. HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS
Corporate farming depends on confinement-style operations.
Humanitarian and moral questions are important issues to consider. In
confinement style corporate farming operations, animals are allowed very
little space to move. The animals do not live a natural life. It is not
uncommon for animals to be physically harmed if they are weaker than
the rest. Animal abuse happens as well. Often the farm managers do not
care about any individual animal.

IV. A Discussion of Technological Change
Technological change has occurred rapidly over the last several decades.
Improved technology has made it feasible for corporations to enter the
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farming industry. Many of the concerns about corporate farming are
actually frustration about the double-edged sword of technological
change. As technology has improved since the early 1900’s, it has
enabled farmers of all kinds to be more efficient. Tractors have replaced
horses and oxen as means of production. New alloys have led to larger
and stronger equipment. Better technology means that farmers can extract
more output from the same amount of input. The problem is that more
efficiency means more output; more output means less revenue per unit
of output due to the simple rules of supply and demand. In order to make
up for the decrease in revenue per unit of output, costs of production must
fall. The best way to make cost per unit of output to fall is to capture
economies of scale (i.e. get bigger). A “vicious cycle” problem is
apparent in this scenario with pressure to expand and produce more. In
some agricultural sectors, corporations are most fit to handle this market.
A way to produce more is to buy more land, or find a way to jam
all sorts of livestock into a small space. Technology has been the driver
behind the failure of countless farms in the United States. Technology
allows fewer people to farm more acres or livestock. Opponents of
corporate farming who argue that it reduces the number of farms are
trying to pin the tail on the wrong donkey. The very phenomenon (better
technology) that has revolutionized farming for some has been the
downfall of many others.

V. The Reach of Corporate Farming
The question arises, “is corporate farming a threat to every type of
farmer?” After all, agriculture is a very broad concept in that it refers to
all of the plant and livestock operations in the United States. Is corporate
farming an issue in all types of farm operations? The short answer is, no.
Virtually all of the research on corporate farming has been conducted on
the livestock sector. Opponents of corporate farming tend not to make
this distinction. Opposition to corporate farming is made on a broad,
sweeping basis. Opponents would have you believe that corporate farms
are prevalent in all types of farm business. In reality, corporate farming
has affected grain crop farmers much less than livestock farmers. In
1992, only 1.3 percent of farm acreage was owned by corporate entities
[Allen and Lueck, 1998, 343]. Acreage is a good measure of the presence
of corporate farms in grain crop production. Raising livestock is no
longer necessarily a land intensive practice, so its portion of the 1.3
percent of acreage is trivial.
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Section IV discussed technology and how it has affected farming
practices. It is technology that has changed the grain crop farm industry
so much. Even if corporate farming were not an issue, farmers would
continually be buying more land, squeezing other farmers out of the
industry. It is much easier for grain crop farmers to put a face on the
“enemy” by declaring that corporate farming is the culprit rather than the
evolution of technology.
There are reasons why corporate farming has not embraced grain
farming to this point. Some industries have attributes that lend
themselves to a factory-style production process. Due to the advances in
technology, there is little doubt that economies of scale exist in
agriculture, no matter what sub-sector (livestock, grain, etc.). Economies
of scale must exist for corporate farming to make sense.
Beyond economies of scale, gains from specialization are
important in determining whether an industry can move to a factory-style
corporate approach. It would be inefficient for farmers to divide up all of
the jobs of grain production and each focus on one. The tasks in grain
farming “…tend to be short, infrequent, and require few distinct tasks,
thus limiting the benefits of specialization [Allen and Lueck, 1998, 344].”
Grain crop farming is a repetitive process, but does not require a different
skill set for each job.
Another factor that has delayed the onset of corporate farming is
the uncertainty that exists within nature. Nature makes the move to
factory-style corporate grain crop farms less likely in two ways. First,
random shocks to output create a risk in farming. Drought, hail, and
infestation are all possibilities. Individual farmers can insure their crops
against seasonal disasters and seasonal shocks. Family farmers are
compensated monetarily for their crop damage. Also, if the cause of the
shock is widespread, the total supply of grain would be low, which would
mean that the price would be relatively high. In general, corporations are
well equipped to handle risk. Corporations, though, face a different risk
in grain crop production. The corporately owned grain farm is a
vertically integrated part of a production process. An important part of
a production process is having consistent and reliable input flows. The
relative uncertainty of grain farming does not provide a reliable input
flow.
Second, grain farming is characterized by natural seasons that
require certain production stages to take place at certain times [Allen and
Lueck, 1998, 346]. Because of these factors, output from farm operations
is limited to the end of natural cycles and the output may differ in quality
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or quantity from what was expected. A consistent and reliable input flow
cannot be achieved because of the seasonality of grain farming.
Allen and Lueck explain that the sectors of agriculture that have
been targeted by corporate farming are not random. Grain operations are
particularly susceptible to the problems that nature presents.
The general trend has been to remove stock from an open
environment and rear them in climate-controlled barns…
[N]ew technologies—in disease control, handling,
nutrition, and transportation—have reduced seasonality
by increasing the number of cycles per year…and
reducing the importance and variability of random
shocks from nature… Compared to field crops, livestock
production allows for greater reduction of natural forces
because stocks are mobile during growing stages and can
often be reared indoors [Allen and Lueck, 1998, 370].
The implications of Allen and Lueck’s paper are important. Corporate
farming will not affect agricultural sectors that are characterized by
random shocks to output and strictly seasonal nearly as much as sectors
that are not affected. According to Allen and Lueck, grain crop
operations should not have to worry about the onset of corporate farming.
Livestock farming, according to Allen and Lueck, is ideal for
factory-style corporate farming because of the ability of technology to
reduce the variability of the forces of nature on livestock production
[1998, 379]. The move to corporate livestock farms was predicted by
sound economic modeling and theory. It would be helpful if discussions
on corporate farming were clearer about what types of farming are
affected. There is little evidence that corporate farming has a serious
interest in grain crop farming in the United States.

VI. Reasons for Corporate Farming
As explained in section IV, when an industry can be made more efficient
from specialization and economies of scale, factory-style corporate
industry will take hold. Livestock farmers have been able to all but
eliminate the role that nature plays in production. Increases in technology
and process innovation have allowed livestock farmers to extract a
reliable and steady flow of output. It makes sense that livestock farming
is an investment opportunity for corporations.
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Open markets allocate resources most efficiently. The movement
towards corporate farming in livestock production has happened because
of market forces. Corporations can secure their inputs (the livestock)
through high volume and highly reliable contracts. The corporation can
then produce a consistent amount of output and can capitalize on
economies of scale if they have a guaranteed flow of input. Factory-style
corporate structured farms can produce more output for less money. The
market rewards efficiency. According to Persaud and Tweeten, the real
price of beef and pork (CPI-adjusted) decreased from 1980 to 1995. The
producer price index (PPI-adjusted) has fallen as well, but at a slower
rate. These differences in rates mean that there is a smaller margin on
each unit of output of meat [2002, 128]. Decreased margins clearly show
that the efficiency gains from corporate factory-style production are being
passed on to consumers. The ability of corporate ownership to take
advantage of economies of scale makes it the best choice for livestock
production.
When an industry gravitates towards fewer but larger firms there
is a tradeoff. That tradeoff is between the effects of market power and
economies of scale. If the gains from economies of scale are greater than
the loss to market power, the shift in the industry is beneficial [Persaud
and Tweeten, 2002, 127]. In the above paragraph, it was noted that
margins in the livestock industry have decreased. In the same time period
that margins decreased (1980-1995), corporate farming really began to
take hold. If fears about the market power of corporate farms distorting
markets are legitimate, margins would not have declined. One reason
corporate farms are integrating throughout the production process is to
take advantage of task specialization. In order for a corporate farm to
operate well, it must “…have farm products at the right time, place,
quantity, quality, and price to process and meet consumers’ demand
[Persaud and Tweeten, 2002, 140-141].” These reforms in the livestock
industry are in response to changes in technology that allow for efficiently
coordinating the entire production process.
Scale economies that can be realized through new technology are
a threat to the family farm structure that has dominated agriculture for so
long. More animals can be farmed with less labor and more capital. In
some situations (such as livestock, where nature can be mitigated)
corporate farming has been the best choice. The scale economies and
efficiency gains have led to large increases in national income that have
benefited farmers in the long run [Persaud and Tweeten, 2002, 141].
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Corporations have an advantage when securing markets and
marketing products. This advantage in marketing not only increased
demand nationally, but can increase global demand. Corporations are
better suited to the challenges of a global economy. Traditional
agriculture would have a much more difficult time capitalizing on the
global economy.

VII. Discussion on Government
Any discussion on the agriculture industry must address the government’s
presence. The government has subsidized farm income and commodity
prices for decades. Between 1950 and 2000, $451 billion was spent on
farm subsidies [Tweeten, 2002, 1]. The government subsidies are meant
to protect farmers from a market that was not believed to work. Natural
production shocks, overproduction and high land prices are all problems
that farmers have to deal with. The government tries to reduce the affects
of these problems by subsidizing income, controlling supply, and offering
relief.
The United States government has played a role in allowing the
family farm to remain to this point. As information is more readily
available, and as farms become larger, it is becoming clear that allowing
the market work and ceasing subsidies is the best way to go [Tweeten,
2002, 1]. Whether or not to subsidize farms is not at issue. Contrary to
common belief, subsidies tend to be awarded to very large farms. As a
result, government subsidies are sometimes referred to as “corporate
welfare.” The largest grain farming operations receive the largest
subsidies.
Perhaps the presence of government programs is one reason why
there is a corporate presence (albeit limited) in grain farming.
Government farm subsidy is a complex topic that deserves its own
research. Subsidies’ effect on the presence of corporate farming is very
difficult to quantify. I can not offer a hypothesis on the direct effect of
subsidies on the corporate farming trend. Its affect on livestock
operations, the main bastion of corporate farming, is clearly limited.

VIII. Discussion on Negative Externalities
Negative externalities are costs of production that are not reflected in the
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price. Negative externalities result in overproduction of a product
because not all of the costs are paid by the producer. The result is that
others have to bear the cost of the externalities. Some concerns about
corporate farming are based on fears of negative externalities. The
efficient amount of corporate farming must have negative externalities
internalized by the farms [Tweeten, 1997, 4]. What are the negative
externalities associated with corporate farming?
Section III discussed arguments against corporate farming. Some
of these arguments have been addressed in the preceding sections. The
decrease in the number of farms can be accounted for almost entirely by
the advances of technology in agriculture. Corporate farming has little to
do with this problem, and has merely capitalized on the trend to move to
a more efficient process with fewer farms.
Section V addressed the complaint that corporate farming puts
too much power in the hands of too few. While more power does rest
with vertically integrated corporate farming operations, there is not yet
evidence that it has resulted in abuse of the power.
The most important negative externalities in corporate farming
are its affects on rural economies and culture, as well as environmental
and humanitarian concerns. As discussed in section III, as corporate
entities take over farming and integrate stages of production, they will
tend to acquire inputs from centralized locations that are not necessarily
in close proximity to the farm operation itself. For example, a large
corporate farm may do all of its borrowing at a large commercial bank
rather than from the local loan officer. The corporate farm will also
purchase all of its farming supplies from venders (possibly) not associated
with the local economy. If a corporate farming operation takes the place
of what was once several family farming operations, the businesses that
rely on farmers to support them would not be able to keep their doors
open. The rural economy is primarily based on the existence of small
farming towns and the agribusiness that happens within those towns.
It is not surprising that agriculture-based small towns in the
Midwest have seen a large drop in population. The population decline is
partially due to the existence of corporate farms procuring operating
resources from large markets that are unrelated to the local rural
economy. As the rural economy goes, so does the rural culture. Small
agricultural towns are the hub of rural culture in the United States. If the
towns suffer, so will the rural culture.
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It is important to note that it is extremely unclear as to what
extent corporate farming has contributed to the decline of the rural
economy and culture. This paper has identified technology as the primary
force in agricultural changes. Because technological change can have the
same effect on communities and culture as corporate farming, it is
difficult to assign any concrete portion solely to corporate farming.
Environmental concerns are valid in corporate farming. Air and
water pollution are big hurdles for large scale corporate farming
operations. But, the same problems are present whether the operating
structure is corporate or not. The shear numbers of animals housed in a
relatively small area cause the problem. Nearly the same argument can
be made for the humanitarian problem. Once again, it is difficult to put
a price on the effect of the environmental negative externality.
Opinions exist on both sides of the environmental question.
Some maintain that if corporations had to account for their negative
environmental externalities, then corporate-style production would not be
the most efficient way of farming [Brehm, 2005, 799]. Others believe
that corporate structure in farming would be the most efficient even if
they did internalize all external costs. There are also ways to reduce the
amount of negative externalities. Locating in remote areas where rural
economies do not already exist would reduce the affects on established
rural economies, and negate the problem of air pollution [Tweeten, 1997,
4]. Humanitarian issues are even more difficult to discuss, but would do
little to affect the market choice of corporate farming.

IX. Conclusions
This paper has discussed the changing landscape of agriculture.
Corporate farming is becoming more prevalent; some are very concerned
by the effects of this shift. Most of the perceived negative effects of
corporate farming in the United States can actually be attributed to
technological change. The technological change has given corporations
the ability to expand into agriculture, especially livestock, and produce
more efficiently. Natural shocks and cycles can be negated by
technology. Vertical integration by corporations is the best and most
efficient way to capture the economies of scale and gains from
specialization available.
Rural communities are dying; there is little argument about that.
The number of farms and the corresponding population has decreased
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drastically over the last 70 years. Can corporate farming damage the rural
culture even more? Because of the nature of grain farming, there is little
chance that corporations will embrace grain production like they have
livestock. Nature maintains a huge role in grain production. Unless
technology makes it possible for producers to standardize grain output
like it has livestock output, there will likely be little interest in corporate
grain farming.
Negative externalities are important to consider, and more
research should be done to develop a model that internalized all of the
costs of corporate farming. It will be difficult to separate the negative
externalities attributed to the existence of corporate farms with those
associated with technological progress. If the gains from corporate
farming outweigh its externalities, as it appears that they do, it should
continue to exist.
If it is determined that limiting corporate farming is a good
method to use in preserving the rural American culture, and society values
that more than more efficient production, corporate farming should be
limited by states. But even though society may value rural American
culture over lower prices, limiting corporate-style farming is probably not
the way to protect it. Instead, technology would have to be intentionally
limited, and probably reduced. It appears that the American rural culture
is in decline, and limiting corporate farming will probably not stop it.
Agricultural states should not oppose corporate farming, unless new
research discovers the negative externalities of corporate farming (and not
technological change) outweigh the benefits they produce.
Hope exists for rural culture in the United States. Family farms
have the opportunity to seek out niche markets that may bring premium
prices. Premium prices may offset their forgone benefit of being larger
and more efficient (capturing economies of scale). Organic markets are
one possibility. Demand exists for organic foods; small family farmers
may find that they are best equipped to capture the market. The
technology that makes farms more efficient is often from genetic
alteration and is heavily reliant on chemicals. Capturing economies of
scale is more difficult without the use of these technologies, and may
leave the door open for small farmers.
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